4.1 - No blurp or comment may contain, without a “sensitive” designation:
4.1.1 - any image, video, or other depiction of death, or of serious physical violence or injury, including nonconsensual sex or sexual assault, in which bodily fluids or organs of any kind (blood, feces, etc.) are visible or represented realistically.
4.1.2 - any image, video, or other depiction of the excretory act of any living being of any species in which bodily fluids of any kind (blood, feces, etc.) are visible or represented realistically.
4.2 - Even with a “sensitive” designation, content in either of these categories that, considering all the context (typically, when no context is provided) appears to be gratuitous and presented to threaten only—is prohibited.
4.3 - Because neither cover images nor profile pictures can be designated as “sensitive,” they may not contain the types of images described above.
5.1 - No blurp, comment, or message sent using our service may contain:
5.1.1 - any attempt to gain money or other value(s) by means of wrongful or criminal deception, including knowingly sharing synthetic or manipulated media where intended to deceive, defraud, or manipulate. (Note: while paid ads may contain manipulated media, and are intended to influence thinking and behavior, they are also clearly labeled as such and can be considered by users accordingly.)
5.1.2 - any trademark or other intellectual property belonging to another, without permission or proper attribution, as appropriate.
5.1.3 - any use of another’s name or likeness in a confusing or deceptive manner
5.1.4 - another’s private information (including non-public contact, financial account, location, medical or other information), or a threat or offer to publicly expose the same.
5.2 - In addition to the above, no user may superimpose a Blurp badge graphic onto his or her profile picture, or otherwise fraudulently portray association with, employment by, or endorsement by Blurp.
6.1 - However, reported blurps, comments, or messages sent using our service will be deemed a violation of these Guidelines if they contain:
6.1.1 - a “serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,” with either the intent or reckless disregard as to whether the communication will “place the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” 3
6.1.2 - an explicit or implicit encouragement to use violence, or to commit a lawless action, such that: (a) the Bluper intends his or her speech to result in the use of violence or lawless action, and (b) the imminent use of violence or lawless action is the likely result of the blurp, comment, or message. 4
6.1.3 - a threat to dox anyone for any reason.
6.1.4 - an offer to give or receive money, or other goods or services, in exchange for (a) a favor from any public official, or (b) the commission of any illegal action by anyone.
1 See, e.g., “Citizens’ Guide to US Federal Law on Child Pornography,” at https://www.justice.gov/criminalceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child-pornography
2 The United States Supreme Court has held that “fighting words”— “insulting language direct[ed] at another person, intending to instigate that person’s imminent violent reaction against the speaker”—are not protected as an exercise of the right to free speech. (Nadine Strossen, Hate: Why We Should Resist It With Free Speech, Not Censorship (2018) at 64.) However, Blurp agrees with those scholars who have opined that, when “such abuse is shared among strangers separated by space and time,” as is true with Blurpers, then the “imminent violent reaction” cannot reasonably be intended. See, e.g., John Samples, “Fighting Words and Free Speech,” June 25, 2018 at https://www.cato.org/blog/fighting-words-freespeech Therefore, such abuse, alone, will not be deemed a violation of our Guidelines.
3 In June 2020, Justice Clarence Thomas noted, in his dissent from denial of cert. in the case, Kansas v. Boettger, that there exists a split among the federal circuits as to the level of intent required for a communication to constitute a “true threat.” Thomas, in the dissent, said he agreed with those circuits who held that States may “criminalize threats, even in the absence of any intent to intimidate.” Per Thomas, “threats of violence made in reckless disregard of causing fear may be prohibited.” See https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062220zor_mjn0.pdf
4 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, “Then-Candidate Trump’s Speech at Rally Wasn’t Constitutionally Unprotected ‘Incitement’ of Violence Against Protesters,” September 11, 2018, at https://reason.com/2018/09/11/thencandidate-trumps-speech-at-rally-wa/ (citing Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444).